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Abstract
We explain why a durable-goods monopolist would like to create a shortage during the launch phase
of a new product. We argue that this incentive arises from the presence of a second-hand market and
uncertainty about consumerswillingness to pay for the good. Consumers are heterogeneous and initially
uninformed about their valuations but learn about them over time. Given demand uncertainty, rst
period sales may result in misallocation and lead to active trading on the secondary market after the
uncertainty is resolved. Trading on the second-hand market will generate additional surplus. This
surplus can be captured by the monopolist ex-ante because consumers are forward-looking, and the
price they are willing to pay incorporates the products resale value. As a consequence, when selling to
uninformed consumers, the monopolist faces the trade-o¤ between more sales today and a lower prot
margin. Specically, because the products resale value is negatively related to the stock of the good in
the second-hand market, selling more units today will result in a lower equilibrium price of the product.
Therefore, the monopolist may nd it optimal to create a shortage and ration consumers to the second
period. We characterize conditions under which the monopolist would like to restrict sales and generate
buying frenzies.
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1 Introduction
Introductions of new goods are often featured by serious shortage and such phenomenon is particularly
pronounced in a durable-goods environment where shortage is coupled with active trading on second-hand
markets. Examples include video games, game consoles, iPads, iPhones and luxury cars. Although shortages
might be driven by limited capacity, shortage of components or demand uncertainty, their repeated occurrence
in durable goods markets suggests that rms may use scarcity as a strategic choice. If the rm benets from
scarcity strategies, what is the mechanism behind them? What are the welfare implications of buying
frenzies? How does the existence of a second-hand market a¤ect the rms optimal selling strategy? These
are the questions addressed in this paper.
The internet revolution has substantially enhanced active trading on second-hand markets when buying
frenzies occur.1 When iPad 2 was launched, Apple stores across the U.S. sold out of the tablet while the
price of it spiked on eBay.2 A similar phenomenon was documented for other electronics including Wii and
PlayStation 2 (see Stock and Balachander, 2005). Despite the important role played by the second-hand
market, it is ignored by the existing literature aiming to explain rms scarcity strategies. In fact, the
predominant theories are not robust against resale. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the rst
one to study durable-goods producersincentives to induce buying frenzies while taking into account active
trading on the second-hand market. Contrary to the existing literature, we argue that the existence of a
second-hand market can be one of the driving forces for buying frenzies.
We develop a model in which production and sales of a durable good occur in two periods. There is
a monopolistic rm in the market and a mass one of two types (optimistic and pessimistic) of consumers
heterogeneous in their valuations for the good. A consumers type is her private information which determines
the probability distribution of her valuation for the good. Specically, optimistic consumers are a¤ectionados
whose distribution of valuation rst-order stochastically dominates the distribution of pessimistic consumers
1See, for example, Rapson and Schiraldi, 2013, for an empirical analysis of the internet impact on the trade volume
of used cars on the second-hand market.
2"iPad 2 Prices Are Spiking on eBay", the Atlantic Wire, March 14, 2011.
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valuation. So, optimistic consumers on average value the good more than pessimistic consumers.
The rst period is the launching phase of the new product and consumers are uncertain about their
valuations. However, they learn about their valuations in the second period which is the products mature
phase and is characterized by the presence of an active second-hand market. When the monopolist sells to
uninformed consumers in the rst period, the product may end up with those who turn out to have low
valuations. Hence, re-allocation of the good among consumers takes place through the second-hand market
when the uncertainty about consumers valuations is resolved. Trading on the second-hand market will
generate an additional surplus. This surplus can be captured by the monopolist ex-ante because consumers
are forward-looking, and the price they are willing to pay incorporates the products resale value. As a
consequence, when selling to uninformed consumers, the monopolist faces the trade-o¤ between more sales
today and a lower prot margin. Specically, because the products resale value is negatively related to the
stock of the goods in the secondary market, selling more units today will result in a lower equilibrium price
of the product. Therefore, the monopolist may nd it optimal to create a shortage and ration consumers to
the second period.
Buying frenzies arise when the monopolist intentionally undersupplies the product (rationing occurs)
and some of the consumers are strictly worse o¤ when being rationed out. In our model, buying frenzies
occur when it is optimal for the monopolist to sell to both types of consumers and ration some of them
to the second period. Among consumers rationed out, optimistic ones are strictly worse o¤ because they
strictly prefer to consume the product in period one. In contrast, pessimistic consumers are indi¤erent
between consuming the product in period one and postponing consumption. Specically, buying frenzies
are more likely to happen when i) there is a large number of pessimistic consumers, and ii) the ex-ante
surplus from selling to pessimistic consumers is su¢ ciently small. Under the former condition, it is optimal
for the monopolist to charge pessimistic consumersmaximum willingness to pay and sell to both types.
Conditional on selling to both types, the latter condition ensures that the monopolist makes more prot
from undersupplying the product than selling to all. To see this, suppose that the monopolist sells to
everyone in period one. By undercutting the supply, the monopolist increases the products resale value
and hence consumerswillingness to pay in period one. So, the marginal benet from restricting supply is
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the incremental increase in the products rst period price multiplied by the total mass of consumers. The
marginal cost of undercutting the supply is the forgone surplus from selling to the marginal consumer in
period one, which is the ex-ante surplus from selling to pessimistic consumers. Thus, when condition ii)
holds, the marginal benet from undersupplying the product outweighs the marginal cost and it is optimal
for the monopolist to ration consumers.
We also analyze the monopolists optimal selling strategy when the secondary market does not exist. In
this case, the monopolist never rations consumers. We compare the social welfare in the presence of the
secondary market and buying frenzies with that when there is no secondary market. Social welfare is higher
without the secondary market when marginal cost is su¢ ciently low. The existence of the secondary market
and consequently buying frenzies may improve social welfare when marginal cost is su¢ ciently high.
While we assume for simplicity that the monopolist commits to future price and quantity, the driving
force for buying frenzies is robust against the monopolists commitment power. We found that when the
monopolist cannot commit to future price and quantity, it may ration consumers more aggressively than it
would like to when it has the commitment power. This is because when the monopolist lacks the commitment
power, it will make too much sales in the second period with respect to what it would like to do from the
rst period point of view. Therefore, in order to maintain a high resale value for the goods, the monopolist
will try to counterbalance this e¤ect by reducing the rst period sales more aggressively which in turn leads
to more consumers rationed to the second period.
Our paper is most closely related to DeGraba (1995). DeGraba argues that when a discrete number of
consumers learn their valuations over time, the monopolist can extract more consumer surplus by committing
to a xed output short of demand in the rst period. When output is short of demand, consumers risk losing
the opportunity to buy the good if they strategically delay purchases. As a consequence, consumers all rush to
buy the good when they are uninformed. DeGrabas results rely on the following assumptions: no secondary
market, no production in the second period and the monopolist cannot commit to future price. The option
of purchasing the good in the second period in case of further production or an active secondary market void
the risk borne by consumers when they delay consumption. We instead show that the monopolist still has
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incentives to induce buying frenzies when we relax these assumptions in an environment with a continuum of
consumers. Moreover, we show that the occurrence of buying frenzies does not depend on the monopolists
ability to commit to future price. Finally, we argue that our results hold under any rationing rule except
for the e¢ cient rationing rule whereas DeGraba focuses on the class of rationing rule with last customer
rationing monotonicity.
Several other papers including Courty and Nasiry (2013), Denicolo and Garella (1999), Stock and Bal-
achander (2005) and Allen and Faulhaber (1991) have o¤ered alternative theories for monopolists scarcity
strategies. None of these papers allows resale. In Courty and Nasiry (2013) the monopolist cannot commit
to second period price, therefore, when it produces more units in period one, consumersoption value of
waiting becomes larger due to a lower second period price. As a consequence, their willingness to pay in
period one becomes smaller. Hence, it may be optimal for the monopolist to ration consumers in period one.
Denicolo and Garella (1999) study a model without demand uncertainty. They argue that rationing reduces
the monopolists incentive to lower future prices and can convince consumers to buy without strategic delay.
This may allow the monopolist to increase its discounted prot. In Denicolo and Garella, if consumers can
resell, the arbitrage across periods will make the rms rationing strategy less protable. Stock and Bal-
achander (2005) and Allen and Faulhaber (1991) show that product scarcity can be used to signal a high
quality of the product.
In our model, the monopolist may prefer a smoothly functioning secondary market for a reason di¤erent
from that in the existing literature (Swan (1980), Rust (1986), Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), Schiraldi and Nava
(2012)). When trade is driven by uncertainty in demand, the secondary market can help the monopolist
to extract surplus generated by reallocation of the goods. In a similar context, Johnson (2011) studies the
implications of uncertainty in demand and the presence of transaction costs on monopoly prot and its choice
of durability.
Courty (2003a, 2003b) studies a monopolists selling strategy in ticket markets when there is demand
uncertainty. In Courty, the monopolist sells either in an early market when consumers are uninformed about
their valuations for tickets or in a late market where their valuations are revealed. Despite the similar features
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shared with Courty, we have di¤erent ndings. Courty found that the monopolist does not gain by selling
tickets in the early market and rationing consumers compared with selling in the late market. In contrast,
we show the monopolist may strictly prefer to sell the good in the early market and ration consumers. The
driving force for the di¤erence is because we focus on durable goods while Courty studies goods that can
only be consumed once.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on intertemporal pricing. Previous work has studied how
the monopolist can use advance-purchase discount (Nocke et al. 2011, Dana 1998) or refund (Courty and
Li 2000) to price discriminate between consumers when the uncertainty of consumersvaluations is resolved
over time. Our paper di¤ers from the previous work by allowing consumers to resell, and in particular, we
focus on how the option of consumer resale a¤ects the monopolists optimal selling strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 characterizes
the equilibrium and shows the conditions under which buying frenzies occur. Section 4 analyzes the monop-
olists optimal selling strategy when there does not exist a secondary market and investigates the welfare
implications of buying frenzies. Section 5 shows that our main results are robust against the monopolists
commitment-power assumption. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
A risk-neutral monopolist sells an indivisible durable good in two trading periods. There is a continuum
of consumers who live for two periods. The mass of consumers is normalized to one. Consumers enter the
market in period one, each buying, at most, one unit of the durable good in her life time. A consumers
valuation for the good is indexed by , with  2 [0; ]. We interpret a consumers valuation as her taste 
multiplied by the products quality which is commonly known and normalized to one. If a consumer with
valuation  buys the good at price p in period t, t = 1; 2, her utility in period t is    p. For expositional
simplicity, we assume the seller and consumers do not discount.3
3We could allow the seller and consumers to have di¤erent discount factors. Our main results hold as long as the
consumers discount factor is not too low. When the consumersdiscount factor is very low, they do not incorporate
the products resale value into their rst period willingness to pay. This will destroy the monopolists incentive to
ration consumers in the rst period.
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In period one, consumers face uncertainty about their valuations and di¤er in their valuation distributions.
There are two types of consumers, type O and P with fractions  and 1  , respectively. Throughout the
paper, we will call type O optimistic consumers and type P pessimistic consumers. A consumers type is
her private information which determines the probability distribution of her valuation for the good. Type
i, i = fO;Pg, consumers valuations are distributed according to cumulative distribution function Fi()
and density function fi() on the interval [0; ]. Optimistic consumersdistribution of valuation rst-order
stochastically dominates the distribution of pessimistic consumersvaluation. That is, Fo()  Fp(), 8 2
[0; ]. Accordingly, optimistic consumers have a greater mean valuation of the good compared with pessimistic
consumers. Throughout the paper, we make the following technical assumption on the distributions of
consumersvaluations to ensure the uniqueness of the monopolists prot maximization problem.
Assumption 1 fo() + (1  )fp() is logconcave.
Consumers become informed about their actual valuations in period two. We assume a consumer learns
her true valuation regardless of her purchase decision in period one. This assumption is reasonable in a
number of situations. For example, a gamer can learn how much she likes a game console by playing it at
her friends house or the game store; a car buyer will learn her valuation for a new car by test drive. At
the beginning of period 2, a secondary market is opened. The good does not depreciate and consumers can
resell it at zero transaction cost.4
The seller wishes to maximize the total prot from the two periods. The marginal cost of the good
is assumed to be constant at c. We assume that the seller can commit to future price and quantity. We
focus on the commitment case to abstract away from the well-studied role of time inconsistency. This
assumption simplies our analysis and the results remain qualitatively the same even when the monopolist
lacks commitment power. We discuss the No Commitment case in Section 5.
Throughout the model we assume that consumers are rationed according to the proportional rationing
rule. Buying frenzies continue to exist under other rationing rules except for the case of e¢ cient rationing.
4See Anderson and Ginsburg (1994); Hendel and Lizzeri, (1999); Hideo and Sandfort, (2002); Schiraldi (2011) and
Waldman (1996) among others for a discussion about the role of the second-hand market when quality depreciates
and/or transaction costs are present.
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With e¢ cient rationing, we still have a rationing equilibrium but consumers are not strictly worse-o¤ when
rationed out. When a new product is introduced, it is normally purchased on a rst-come-rst-served basis.
The order of arrival is not only determined by consumersdesire to consume the good, but also by their
opportunity costs of shopping. There is no reason to believe that optimistic consumers have uniformly lower
opportunity costs of shopping than pessimistic consumers. In addition, ex-post some pessimistic consumers
will have higher valuations than optimistic ones. Therefore, proportional rationing seems more natural than
e¢ cient rationing in our context. The timing of the model is summarized as follows:
 Period 1. At the beginning of the period, consumers learn their types. The seller announces the prices
and supplies in the two periods. Then, consumers decide whether to buy the good after observing
(p1; q1; p2; q2).
 Period 2. Consumers learn their true valuations. A secondary market is opened. Consumers who have
purchased the good in period one decide whether to resell it, and those who havent bought the good
decide whether to buy it and from whom to buy.
3 Equilibrium
In the rst period, the monopolist faces a cohort of consumers with two di¤erent levels of willingness to
pay. If the monopolist charges the pessimistic consumersmaximum willingness to pay, optimistic consumers
will also purchase the good at this price because they have a higher expected valuation. In this case, the
monopolist can sell the good to both types of consumers. Alternatively, the monopolist can charge the
optimistic consumersmaximum willingness to pay and exclude the pessimistic consumers in the rst period
.
In this section, we rst discuss the monopolists maximum prot from selling to both types of consumers
in the rst period. The case of selling to optimistic consumers exclusively follows. We then characterize the
conditions under which buying frenzies happen or rationing occurs.
8
3.1 Selling to both types of consumers
Consider a type i, i = fO;Pg, consumers purchase decision in period one. If the consumer buys the good
immediately, she enjoys ow utility Ei()   p1. In the next period, the consumer will keep the good if her
valuation turns out to be greater than the resale price p2; the consumer will resell the good in the secondary
market at price p2, otherwise. Hence, the consumers expected payo¤ from purchasing the good in period
one is
Ei()  p1 + [(1  Fi(p2))Ei(j > p2) + Fi(p2)p2]: (1)
Alternatively, the consumer can delay consumption until her valuation is revealed in period two. Antici-
pating that she will buy the good only when her valuation is greater than p2, the consumers expected payo¤
from waiting is
(1  Fi(p2))[Ei(j > p2)  p2]: (2)
Comparing (1) and (2), the consumer will buy the good in period one if and only if
p1  Ei() + p2:
Observe that the consumers rst period maximum willingness to pay is increasing in p2. This is because
the secondary market provides an insurance to the consumer. When the good maintains a high resale value,
the consumer will bear a smaller loss if she turns out to have a low valuation. Hence, the consumer is willing
to pay more for the good up front. Notice that the monopolist benets from having a smoothly functioning
second-hand market. If transaction costs were present, they would reduce the maximum willingness to pay
of consumers because they would expect a lower resale value for the purchased goods which in turn would
reduce the monopolists prot. A smooth second-hand market increases surplus which is captured by the
monopolist.
Since Ep() < Eo(), when the monopolist charges pessimistic consumersmaximum willingness to pay
Ep() + p2, both types of consumers are willing to buy the good. The monopolist chooses q1, p2 and q2
to maximize its expected prot subject to the market clear condition in the second period.5 Given that
5When the monopolist charges p1 = Ep() + p2, pessimistic consumers are just indi¤erent between purchasing
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consumers can trade with each other in the secondary market, the equilibrium secondary market price must
equal the second period price charged by the monopolist. Otherwise, there will be arbitrage opportunities
and the prices will be adjusted. The secondary market will allocate the good to consumers who value it the
most. Consequently, the market clear condition requires

Z
p2
fo()d + (1  )
Z
p2
fp()d = q1 + q2: (3)
The right hand side of (3) is the total stock of the good in period two, whereas the left hand side of (3)
is the number of consumers with valuations greater than p2. To simplify exposition, we dene G() 
Fo() + (1  )Fp() and g()  fo() + (1  )fp(). The market clear condition is simplied to
q1 + q2 = 1 G(p2): (4)
When selling to both types of consumers, the monopolist solves the following program:
Max
q1, p2, q2
(Ep() + p2   c)q1 + (p2   c)q2 (5)
subject to the market clear condition (4) and the boundary conditions
0  q1 + q2  1 (6)
q1; q2  0: (7)
We rst show that it is never optimal for the monopolist to shut down the market in period one and only
sell in period two. Notice that the following lemma is also valid when the monopolist targets optimistic
consumers and sell to them exclusively in period one.
Lemma 1 Selling in the second period only is never optimal.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is that for a given level of output, it is always more protable for the
monopolist to sell a small fraction of the good in the rst period and the remaining units in the second
the good immediately and waiting. However, in equilibrium, the rst period demand must be at least the supply
q1. To see this, suppose the monopolists optimal prot  is achieved at q1 < 1. If the demand is less than q

1 ,
the monopolist can achieve a prot arbitrarily close to  by undercutting price slightly below Ep() + p2 and still
manage to sell q1 units.
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period. This is because the monopolist can charge a strictly higher price for the units sold in the rst period
without a¤ecting the second period price which is determined by the total stock of the good.
At the price Ep() +p2, all consumers are willing to buy the good in period one, but the monopolist may
not be interested in selling to all of them. When is it optimal for the monopolist to ration consumers? The
solution for the monopolists prot maximization program is summarized by the following lemma:
Lemma 2 When the monopolist sells to both types of consumers, it only sells in period one, i.e. q2 = 0. If
Ep()  c < 1
g(0)
, the monopolist chooses q1 < 1 and the corresponding prot is (Ep() + p2   c)(1 G(p2))
with Ep() + p2  c = 1 G(p2)g(p2) . If Ep()  c 
1
g(0)
, the monopolist chooses q1 = 1. The corresponding prot
is Ep()  c.
When choosing the rst period output q1, the seller faces the trade-o¤ between more sales in period
one and a lower prot margin. By selling more of the good today, the seller will increase the stock in the
secondary market and hence reduce the goods resale value. Anticipating this, a forward looking consumer
is willing to pay less in the rst period because she expects to receive less payment from resale.
To better understand Lemma 2, imagine that the monopolist sells to all consumers in period one. That
is, it chooses q1 = 1. Because no one will buy the good from the secondary market, the goods resale value
is reduced to zero. Now, suppose the seller slightly undercuts the rst period output. Some consumers will
be rationed out and their purchases in the second period will create a positive resale value of the good.
This in turn will increase the goods rst period price. How much is the monopolists marginal benet from
undercutting the rst period output by one unit? The marginal change in p2 in response to a marginal
change in q1 at p2 = 0 is
dp2
dq1
jp2=0 =
dG 1(1  q1   q2)
dq1
jq1+q2=1 =
 1
g(0)
:
Because pessimistic consumersmaximum willingness to pay in period one is Ep() + p2, the monopolists
rst period price will increase by
1
g(0)
. Hence, its marginal benet from undercutting the rst-period output
by one unit is
1
g(0)
multiplied by 1, the total mass of consumers. Now, consider the monopolists marginal
cost of undercutting q1. When the monopolist sells to everyone in the rst period, the maximum price it can
charge is Ep(). So, if the monopolist reduces one unit output in period one, it loses an amount Ep()   c
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which is its marginal cost from undercutting q1. When the condition Ep() c < 1
g(0)
holds, the monopolists
marginal benet from undercutting q1 outweighs its marginal cost. So, it is optimal for the monopolist to
ration some consumers to the second period.
Corollary 1 The monopolists optimal prot from selling to both types of consumers is (weakly) increasing
in .
To see the corollary, rst consider Ep()   c < 1
g(0)
. The monopolist rations consumers in period one
and makes the optimal prot (Ep() + p2   c)(1 G(p2)). The derivative of its optimal prot with respect
to  is (Ep() + p2   c)(Fp(p2)   Fo(p2))  0. When the fraction of optimistic consumers becomes larger,
the monopolist can sell more units in period one while retaining the products resale value. Hence, its prot
is increasing in . By Lemma 2, the monopolist sells to all consumers when Ep()  c  1
g(0)
and its prot
is constant in .
When consumers are rationed to the second period, a fraction  of them are optimistic consumers and a
fraction 1  of them are pessimistic consumers. Because pessimistic consumers are charged their maximum
willingness to pay in the rst period, they are indi¤erent between buying the good in the rst period and the
second period. By contrast, optimistic consumers strictly prefer to buy the good in period one. So, rationing
has di¤erent welfare impacts on the two types of consumers.
Corollary 2 When the monopolist rations consumers, optimistic consumers are strictly worse o¤ when
rationed out but pessimistic consumers are not worse o¤.
3.2 Selling to optimistic consumers exclusively
Now, we turn to the case where the monopolist targets optimistic consumers and sells to them exclusively.
We have shown in the previous analysis that optimistic consumersmaximum willingness to pay in period
one is Eo() + p2. Hence, the monopolist chooses q1 and p2, q2 to maximize
(Eo() + p2   c)q1 + (p2   c)q2
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subject to the market clear condition (4) and the boundary conditions
0  q1   (8)
0  q2  1  q1:
First, notice that the same market clear condition (4) holds both when the monopolist targets pessimistic
consumers and optimistic consumers. This is because the market clear condition only requires that the second
period price equal the valuation of the marginal consumer in the second period. The marginal consumer in
the second period is determined by the total stock of the good q1 + q2 and does not depend on who owns
the good in the rst period. Second, for a xed p2, pessimistic consumersmaximum willingness to pay is
Ep() + p2 < Eo() + p2. Hence, at price Eo() + p2, the rst period demand is at most .
Lemma 1 has shown that it is never optimal for the monopolist to sell in period two only. So, we focus on
the case where q1 > 0 and analyze when the monopolist may benet from rationing optimistic consumers in
the rst period. To begin, we rst present a lemma which will be used to analyze the monopolists optimal
selling strategy. Dene H()  G 1(1  )  c  g(G 1(1 )) .
Lemma 3 H() is strictly decreasing in .
When selling to optimistic consumers exclusively, the monopolists optimal selling strategy depends on
the value of the function H() and is characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 As  increases from zero to one, the monopolists optimal strategy is summarized by the following
table
Case condition q1 q

2 (q

1 ; q

2)
1 0 < H()  > 0 (Eo() + p2   c) + (p2   c)q2
2  Eo()  H()  0  0 (Eo() +G 1(1  )  c)
3 H() <  Eo() <  0 (Eo() +G 1(1  q1)  c)q1
,
where in Case 1, q2 and p2 are determined by G
 1(1  q2) c = +q

2
g(G 1(1  q2 ))and p2 = G
 1(1  q2);
in Case 3, q1 is determined by G
 1(1  q1)  c  q

1
g(G 1(1 q1 )) =  Eo().
When choosing optimal rst period sales, the monopolist faces the same trade-o¤ between more sales
in period one and lower prot margin as in the case of selling to both types of consumers. This trade-
o¤ depends on the relative proportion of the two groups. If  is very low, the monopolist will sell to all
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optimistic consumers in period one because this will not reduce the goods resale value signicantly. In
addition, the monopolist will also sell the good in the second period to capture the large demand from
pessimistic consumers. As  increases the incentive to sell in the second period decreases because by selling
in the second period, the monopolist will drive down the equilibrium secondary market price and consequently
reduce the price and prot from selling to optimistic consumers in the rst period. When  is large enough,
the monopolist will not only stop selling in the second period (Case 2) but eventually nd it optimal to
restrict sales in the rst period below  in order to maintain a high resale value of the good (Case 3). We
characterize the monopolists optimal prot as a function of  in the next corollary.
Corollary 3 When the monopolist sells to optimistic consumers exclusively, the optimal prot is continuous
and increasing in .
By charging the optimistic consumersmaximum willingness to pay, the monopolist gives up the pes-
simistic consumers in the rst period. So, when the fraction of optimistic consumers becomes larger, the
monopolist has less to lose by selling to optimistic consumers exclusively in the rst period and hence will
make more prot.
In Case 3, some of the optimistic consumers are rationed to the second period, but since these consumers
are charged their maximum willingness to pay in the rst period, they are not worse o¤ when rationed out.
Corollary 4 When the monopolist sells to optimistic consumers exclusively, consumers are not worse o¤
when rationed to the second period.
3.3 Optimal selling strategy and buying frenzies
Corollaries 1 and 3 show that the monopolists optimal prot is increasing in  both when the monopolist
sells to all types of consumers and optimistic consumers exclusively. Hence, for a given , the comparison
of the protability between these two selling strategies depends on the shapes of the distribution functions
Fo() and Fp(). Nevertheless, we can rank these two selling strategies when  is su¢ ciently large or small.
Proposition 1 The monopolist charges pessimistic consumers maximum willingness to pay and sells to
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both types of consumers when  < b, where b 2 (0; H 1(0)). It sells to optimistic consumers exclusively
when   bb  H 1( Eo()).
For a xed second period price p2, optimistic consumers have a higher willingness to pay than pessimistic
consumers in the rst period. Therefore, when choosing the optimal rst period price, the monopolist
faces the standard trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and rent seeking and the trade-o¤ hinges on the fraction of
optimistic consumers . When the majority of consumers are pessimistic ( < b), selling to optimistic
consumers exclusively will create a large ine¢ ciency which constrains the maximum surplus the monopolist
can possibly extract from consumers. By contrast, if the monopolist charges pessimistic consumersmaximum
willingness to pay and sells to both types of consumers, the e¢ ciency is signicantly improved. Even though
the monopolist has to give up some rent to optimistic consumers, the gain in surplus dominates the rent
given to optimistic consumers because of their small size. As a result, the monopoly prot is maximized by
selling to both types of consumers.
Alternatively, when the majority of consumers are optimistic (  bb), the monopolist would have given
up too much rent to optimistic consumers if it charges pessimistic consumers maximum willingness to
pay. The monopolist benets from selling to optimistic consumers exclusively and extracts the maximal
possible surplus from them. Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal selling strategy for  su¢ ciently high or
su¢ ciently low. For intermediate value of , it is not possible to establish the optimal monopoly strategies
(selling to both types vs. optimistic consumers exclusively) because it will depend on the specic shape of
the demand.
Based on the monopolists optimal selling strategy, we summarize in the following proposition the su¢ -
cient conditions for rationing and buying frenzies to occur in period one.
Proposition 2 The monopolist rations consumers in period one when  < b or  > bb. Buying Frenzies
occur under the former condition if Ep()  c < 1
g(0)
.
If the fraction of pessimist consumers is large ( < b), the optimal rst period price will attract both
types of consumers. However the monopolist prefers to choose q1 < 1 and create buying frenzies when
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Ep()   c < 1
g(0)
(Lemma 2). In this case, pessimistic consumers are indi¤erent between purchasing the
good in the rst period and postponing consumption because the rst period price is equal to their expected
utility. Optimistic consumers, however, are strictly worse-o¤. If the fraction of optimistic consumers is large
enough ( > bb), the monopolist will sell to optimistic consumers exclusively and ration some of them to the
second period. Nevertheless, optimistic consumers are not worse o¤ when rationed out because they are just
indi¤erent between buying the good in period one and in period two.
Proposition 2 characterizes the su¢ cient condition for buying frenzies. Notice that buying frenzies arise
only when both types of consumers are willing to buy the good in the rst period and some optimistic
consumers are rationed out. Does the monopolists incentive to ration consumers depend on the rationing
rule applied? Suppose that the monopolist nds it optimal to sell to both types of consumers in period one.
The rst period optimal output q1 is not a¤ected by the nature of the rationing rule. To see this, notice
that pessimistic consumersmaximum willingness to pay in period one is invariant to the specication of the
rationing rule. This is because the equilibrium secondary market price p2 is determined solely by q1 + q2,
the total stock of the good, and is not a¤ected by how q1 is allocated between consumers in period one.
Therefore, the monopolists prot maximization problem (5) remains unchanged when we adopt a di¤erent
rationing rule.
Although the monopolists optimal rst period output q1 does not depend on the nature of the rationing
rule, whether buying frenzies will occur hinges on whether the rationing is e¢ cient. Since consumers are only
aware of their types in period one, e¢ cient rationing in our context means that optimistic consumers will
receive the good before pessimistic consumers. To see how the rationing rule may a¤ect the occurrence of
buying frenzies, suppose that the monopolist nds it optimal to sell to both types of consumers and choose
q1 2 (; 1). Given the e¢ cient rationing rule, only pessimistic consumers are rationed to the second period
and they are indi¤erent between buying the good immediately and postponing consumption. Any other
rationing rule which leaves some optimistic consumers without the good will generate buying frenzies. As
we discuss in the model section, a non-e¢ cient rationing rule like the proportional rationing rule seems more
plausible in the context of a new product launch.
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4 No secondary market & Welfare
In this section, we study the monopolists optimal selling strategy when there is no secondary market and
explore the welfare implications of having or banning the secondary market. We nd that when the secondary
market is banned, the monopolist never rations consumers. This result highlights that the presence of a
secondary market is the key driving force for rationing and buying frenzies in our model.
4.1 Optimal selling strategy without a secondary market
As in the previous section, we rst analyze the monopolists optimal strategy when it targets di¤erent types
of consumers. Then we characterize the monopolists overall optimal strategy. We adopt the following
assumption to rule out the uninteresting case where the monopolist only sells in period two.
Assumption 2 2Ep() > 
Consider a pessimistic consumers purchase decision in period one. Because there is no secondary market,
the consumer must consume the good in both periods once she purchases it in period one. Hence, the
consumers expected utility from purchasing the good immediately is 2Ep() p1. By contrast, the consumers
expected utility from postponing consumption is (1   Fp(p2))(Ep[j  p2]   p2). Comparing these two
options, the consumer will purchase the good in period one if and only if
p1  2Ep()  (1  Fp(p2))(Ep[j  p2]  p2). (9)
Given xed prices p1 and p2, how is the consumers rst period decision di¤erent from the case when a
secondary market is available? The consumers utility from waiting is the same regardless of the availability
of the secondary market. However, the consumer receives a higher utility from purchasing the good in period
one when there is a secondary market. This is because the consumer can resell the good and receive price
p2 if her true valuation turns out to be lower than the secondary market price. By contrast, the consumer
has to consume the good and enjoy utility Ep(j < p2) when the secondary market is unavailable. Since
Ep(j < p2) < p2, the consumer has a lower maximum willingness to pay in the rst period when the
secondary market is unavailable. Next, we analyze the monopolists optimal selling strategy when it sells to
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both types of consumers.
Lemma 5 Selling in the second period only is never optimal.
Suppose that the monopolist only sells in period two. Then at most it will make a prot    c. By
Assumption 2, we have    c  2Ep[]   c, where 2Ep[]   c is the monopoly prot from selling to all the
pessimistic consumers in period one while charging the second period price p2 = . This contradicts the
initial hypothesis. Next, we characterize the monopolists optimal selling strategy when selling to both types
of consumers in period one.
Lemma 6 If the monopolist charges pessimistic consumersmaximum willingness to pay in period one, its
optimal strategy is q1 = 1; q

2 = 0 and p

2 =

The monopolist extracts the entire surplus from all the pessimistic consumers by choosing q1 = 1 and
charging p2 = . If instead the monopolist rations out some consumers and sells them in period two, it loses
prot due to the reduced sales in period one. Moreover, the monopolist has to reduce the price in period
one because consumers anticipate that the monopolist will continue to sell in period two and therefore have
an incentive to postpone their purchases to period two when they become informed. The total loss in prot
is not compensated by the prot generated in the second period because only a fraction of the consumers
rationed out will purchase the good in period two.
Next we show the optimal monopoly strategy if the monopolist sells to optimistic consumers exclusively
in period one.
Lemma 7 If the monopolist targets optimistic consumers and sells to them exclusively in the rst period,
the optimal strategy is q1 = ; q

2  0 and p2  
Similarly to the discussion after Lemma 6, the monopolist nds that it is more protable to extract as
much as possible surplus from consumers when they face uncertainty about their valuations in period one
compared with the case when they become fully informed in period two. Notice that p2 not only a¤ects the
demand from pessimistic consumers in the second period but also constrains the maximum price that can be
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charged in the rst period. This is because optimistic consumers can delay consumption and buy the good
at p2 when they become informed in period two. The following proposition characterizes the monopolists
overall optimal selling strategy as a function of :
Proposition 3 The monopolist will sell to both types of consumers when  < e, where e 2 (0; 1), and it
will sell to optimistic consumers exclusively when e  .
Similarly to the previous section with a secondary market, the monopolist nds that it is more protable
to attract both types of consumers when the fraction of optimistic consumers is low enough. Otherwise,
it maximizes prot by selling to optimistic consumers exclusively in period one and then selling also to (a
fraction of) pessimistic consumers in period two.
4.2 Buying Frenzies and Welfare
We have shown in the previous sections that buying frenzies are driven by trading on the secondary market.
In this section, we discuss the welfare implications of banning the secondary market when buying frenzies
arise.
The previous sections have established that the monopolist prefers selling to both types of consumers
when  is below a certain threshold and to optimistic consumers exclusively when  is large enough. We
restrict attention to the former case because buying frenzies may occur in this parameter range in the
presence of secondary market. To simplify exposition, let E()  Eo() + (1  )Ep() and E(j < p) =
Eo(j < p) + (1  )Ep(j < p).
When  < minfb; eg; the monopolist will target both types of consumers either with or without a
secondary market. Without secondary market, the monopolist will sell to all consumers in period one (see
Lemma 6). The total surplus is
WNS = 2E()  c. (10)
Since consumers cannot resell the good, they will consume the good for two periods. The rst item in WNS
is consumer valuation from consumption and the second item is the cost of production.
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When there is a secondary market, the monopolist will choose q1 2 (0; 1) and q2 = 0 (see Lemma 2).
The corresponding total surplus is
WS = q1 [E()  c] + q1E(j  p2), (11)
where p2 is determined by Ep() + p2   c = 1 G(p2)g(p2) and q1 is pinned down by the market clear condition
q1 = 1   G(p2). The rst item of WS is the social surplus generated by q1 units of the good in the rst
period. In period two, the q1 units are allocated to consumers with valuations greater than p

2 through
trading on the secondary market. The second item of WS captures consumer valuation from consumption
in period two. The di¤erence between the social surplus in the two scenarios is
WS  WNS = q1 [E(j  p2)  E()]  (1  q1) [2E()  c] . (12)
In both scenarios, the good is randomly allocated to consumers in period one. However, when the secondary
market exists, the good will be allocated to consumers with the highest valuations in period two. By contrast,
the good will continue to be consumed by consumers randomly in period two when there is no secondary
market. Hence, secondary market generates a gain in allocation e¢ ciency, which is captured by the rst
item in (12). The second item in (12) captures the welfare loss due to under production in the presence of
secondary market. The monopolist will produce 1  q1 additional units when there is no secondary market
and the associated total surplus per unit is 2E()   c which is positive (otherwise the monopolist will not
sell to all consumers when there is no secondary market) under the assumptions 2Ep() >  > c.
The welfare comparison depends on the trade-o¤ between the gain in allocation e¢ ciency and the loss
due to under production. The following proposition characterizes the condition under which buying frenzies
reduce welfare.
Proposition 4 When buying frenzies occur, banning the second-hand market improves welfare if
c < E() + E(j < p2) (13)
and it reduces welfare otherwise.
Notice that the right hand side of (13) is a function of c. Because the di¤erence WS   WNS is not
monotone in c, we cannot tell in general at what level of c the condition (13) is satised. To see that
20
WS  WNS is non-monotonic in c, recall p2 is increasing in c. So the per unit gain in allocation e¢ ciency
is increasing in c. However, q1 is decreasing in c. As a consequence, the total gain from allocation e¢ ciency
(the rst item in (12)) is not monotone in c. How about the loss from under production? As c goes up, the
social surplus from each unit of the good decreases. However, under production becomes more severe; that
is, 1  q1 increases in c. This implies that the total loss due to under production is also non-monotonic in c.
So, we cannot tell how WS  WNS changes in c without imposing additional assumptions on the shape of
the distribution functions Fo() and Fp().
Nevertheless, it is clear that when buying frenzies occur, banning the secondary market improves welfare
for su¢ ciently small c. The condition (13) is satised at c = 0. By continuity, it is satised when c is
su¢ ciently small. In fact, when c = 0, the equilibrium without secondary market is socially e¢ cient. This is
because the monopolist sells the good to all consumers in period one and therefore consumption is e¢ cient.
It is not clear though whether allowing the secondary market in the presence of buying frenzies could
enhance welfare. That is, whether
c > E() + E(j < p2) (14)
is satised for some c. When c goes up, p2 goes up and consequently E(j < p2) becomes larger. Buying
frenzies are likely to enhance welfare when demand curve is relatively elastic. In this case, p2 goes up slowly
when c increases and (14) is likely to be satised for large c.6
5 No Commitment
In this section, we discuss the role of commitment and how it a¤ects the buying-frenzies strategies. It is well
known that when a durable good monopolist cannot commit to future price and quantity, it will make too
much sales in the second period with respect to what the monopolist would like to do from the rst period
point of view. Therefore, in order to maintain a high resale value for the good, the monopolist will try to
counterbalance this e¤ect by reducing even more the quantity sold in the rst period which in turn leads to
a larger fraction of consumers rationed to the second period. Specically, the next proposition shows that
6A similar trade-o¤ arises also when the monopolist target optimistic consumers only.
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the lack of commitment power does not reduce the monopolists incentive to ration consumers. In fact, when
buying frenzies occur, the monopolist will ration at least the same number of consumers to the second period
as it would like to do when it has commitment power. Let qr1c denote the number of consumers rationed to
the second period in buying frenzies when the monopolist can commit to p2 and q2.
Proposition 5 When the monopolist targets both types of consumers, buying frenzies occur if Ep()   c <
1
g(0)
and at least qr1c consumers are rationed to the second period.
The proof involves several steps and is relegated to an online Appendix. The proposition shows that
when it is optimal for the monopolist to attract both types of consumers, the condition for buying frenzies
to occur remains unchanged even when the monopolist lacks commitment power. In fact, the monopolist
may ration more consumers to the second period in buying frenzies when it lacks commitment power.
6 Conclusion
This paper explains why a durable-goods monopolist would like to restrict supply and induce buying frenzies
in the presence of an active secondary market and demand uncertainty. While the existing literature ignores
the important role played by the secondary market, we argue that the option of reselling the good on the
secondary market can be one of the driving forces for the rms scarcity strategy. We show that when
consumers are heterogenous in their distribution of valuations, optimistic consumers are strictly worse o¤
when rationed out in buying frenzies. By contrast, pessimistic consumers are indi¤erent between buying the
good in period one and being rationed to period two. We also nd that banning secondary market could be
welfare enhancing when buying frenzies occur and the marginal cost of production is su¢ ciently low.
Finally, we emphasize that our explanation does not exclude other explanations for good scarcity. In
particular, the scarcity of fashion products can also be driven by consumersneed for exclusivity. Moreover,
similar behavior could be explained in a context where rms can inuence social learning among consumers
by manipulating the launch sequence of a new good. It is noted that it can be protable for a rm to restrict
the access of a new good to consumers in order to induce a purchasing herd (Liu and Schiraldi 2011).
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Appendix
Proof for Lemma 1: We prove Lemma 1 by contradiction. Assume that the monopolists optimal
strategy is to sell only in period two, i.e. q1 = 0, then the monopolists prot maximization problem is
Max
p2
(p2   c)(1 G(p2)), (15)
given that all consumers become informed about their valuations in the second period. Let pm2 denote the
monopolists optimal second period price and (pm2   c) is the per unit prot obtained by the monopolist.
Suppose the monopolist sells one unit of the good in period 1 instead of period 2 and continues to sell the rest
of the units in period two. Since the total stock of the good in period two remains unchanged, the market
clear condition (4) implies that p2 remains unchanged under this alternative selling strategy. However, the
prot from selling one unit in the rst period is (Ep() + pm2   c) which is strictly larger then (pm2   c) and
contradicts the initial hypothesis. Q.E.D.
Proof for Lemma 2: The proof has two steps. Step 1 shows given p1 = Ep() +p2, the monopolist will
optimally choose q2 = 0. Step 2 shows q

1 < 1 if and only if Ep()  c 
1
g(0)
< 0.
Step 1. Substitute p2 = G 1(1  q1   q2) into the the objective function (5). We rst show the prot
function
(q1; q2) = (Ep() +G
 1(1  q1   q2)  c)q1 + (G 1(1  q1   q2)  c)q2 (16)
is concave. Take the derivative of (q1; q2) with respect to q1 and q2, respectively.
@(q1; q2)
@q1
= Ep() +G
 1(1  q1   q2)  c  q1 + q2
g(G 1(1  q1   q2)) (17)
@(q1; q2)
@q2
= G 1(1  q1   q2)  c  q1 + q2
g(G 1(1  q1   q2)) : (18)
Because
@(q1; q2)
@q2
and
@(q1; q2)
@q1
are identical except for the constant term Ep() and q1 and q2 enter
@(q1; q2)
@q1
and
@(q1; q2)
@q2
in the form of q1 + q2, the second derivatives are
@2(q1; q2)
@q21
=
@2(q1; q2)
@q22
=
@2(q1; q2)
@q1@q2
=
@2(q1; q2)
@q2@q1
=
 1
g(G 1(1  q1   q2))

2 +
(q1 + q2)g
0(G 1(1  q1   q2))
g2(G 1(1  q1   q2))

:
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By Assumption 1, 2 + (q1+q2)g
0(G 1(1 q1 q2))
g2(G 1(1 q1 q2)) > 0. To see this, by Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005, Economic
Theory) Theorem 3, log concave g(p2) implies log concave survival function 1 G(p2). So, we have
d2 ln(1 G(p2))
dp22
=
 g0(p2)(1 G(p2))  g2(p2)
(1 G(p2))2  0 (19)
Inequality (19) holds if and only if
 g0(p2)(1 G(p2))  g2(p2)  0
g0(p2)(1 G(p2))
g2(p2)
  1: (20)
Substitute p2 = G 1(1  q1   q2) into (20), it follows that
(q1 + q2)g
0(G 1(1  q1   q2))
g2(G 1(1  q1   q2))   1 >  2.
Hence, 2 + (q1+q2)g
0(G 1(1 q1 q2))
g2(G 1(1 q1 q2)) > 0 and
@2(q1; q2)
@q21
< 0. So, the Hessian matrix is
@2(q1; q2)@q21
   1  1 1  1

, (21)
which is negative denite. Hence, (q1; q2) is global concave.
Now, we show q2 = 0. First, ignore the boundary conditions. Let q

1 and q

2 denote the solution for the
optimization problem. Suppose q2 > 0. Then, (18)  0 at (q1 ; q2). This implies (17)> 0 at (q1 ; q2). As a
consequence, it must be that q1 = 1. This contradicts (6).
Step 2. Given that (q1; q2) is globally concave and q2 = 0, the solution q

1 < 1 if and only if
@(q1; q2)
@q1
jq1=1; q2=0 = Ep()  c 
1
g(0)
< 0 (22)
So, when (22) holds, the monopoly prot is
 = (Ep() + p2   c)(1 G(p2));
where p2 is determined by
Ep() + p2   c = 1 G(p2)
g(p2)
; (23)
and the corresponding optimal rst period output is q1 = 1 G(p2). When (22) is violated, q1 = 1 and the
monopoly prot is (Ep()  c). Q.E.D.
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Proof for Lemma 3: The derivative of H() is
H 0() =  G 1
0
(1  )  g(G
 1(1  )) + g0(G 1(1  ))G 10 (1  )
g2(G 1(1  )) :
Substituting
G 1
0
(1  ) = 1
g(G 1(1  ))
into H 0(), we have
H 0() =
 1
g(G 1(1  ))

2 +
g0(G 1(1  ))
g2(G 1(1  ))

:
We have shown in step 1 of the proof for Lemma 2 that 2 + (q1+q2)g
0(G 1(1 q1 q2))
g2(G 1(1 q1 q2)) > 0, 8q1; q2, with
0  q1 + q2  1. Let q1 + q2 =   1. It follows that 2 + g
0(G 1(1 ))
g2(G 1(1 )) > 0 and hence H
0() < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof for Corollary 1: The monopolists optimal prot from selling to both types of consumers is
maxf(Ep() + p2   c)(1 G(p2)), Ep()  cg.
Take the derivative of (Ep() + p2   c)(1   G(p2)) with respect to  and apply the Envelope theorem, we
have
(Ep() + p2   c)(Fp(p2)  Fo(p2))  0.
The term Ep()  c is constant in . As a result, maxf(Ep() + p2   c)(1 G(p2)), Ep()  cg is increasing
in . Q.E.D.
Proof for Lemma 4: First notice that Lemma 3 establishes the monotonicity of H() which charac-
terized the conditions for the di¤erent strategies as functions of . The proof has three steps. Step 1 shows
that the monopolists prot function is globally concave in q1and q2. Step 2 shows q1 <  and q

2 > 0 cannot
be the solution. Step 3 proves the results in the table.
Step 1. Substituting p2 = G 1(1  q1   q2) from (4) into the monopolists prot function, it follows that
(q1; q2) = (Eo() +G
 1(1  q1   q2)  c)q1 + (G 1(1  q1   q2)  c)q2: (24)
Note that (24) is identical to (16) except for the constant term in the rst parentheses. Because this constant
term does not enter the second derivatives, the Hessian matrix is the same as (21) which is shown to be
negative denite.
25
Step 2. We can rewrite (24) as
Eo()q1 + (G
 1(1  q1   q2)  c)(q1 + q2). (25)
Suppose q1 <  and q

2 > 0. Then, the monopolist can make more prot by substituting one unit of q1
for q2. The substitution will not change the total stock q1 + q2 and hence the second item in (25) remains
unchanged. But the rst item in (25) becomes larger.
Step 3. Due to step 2, the optimal solution must be q1 <  and q

2 = 0 or q

1 =  and q

2  0. Since (24)
is globally concave, Case 1 happens if
@(q1; q2)
@q1
jq1=;q2=0  0 (26)
@(q1; q2)
@q2
jq1=;q2=0 > 0. (27)
The derivatives
@(q1; q2)
@q1
= Eo() +G
 1(1  q1   q2)  c  q1 + q2
g(G 1(1  q1   q2))
@(q1; q2)
@q2
= G 1(1  q1   q2)  c  q1 + q2
g(G 1(1  q1   q2)) :
Because
@(q1; q2)
@q1
>
@(q1; q2)
@q2
, 8q1; q2, (27) implies (26). The condition (27) is satised when
G 1(1  )  c  
g(G 1(1  )) > 0.
In Case 1, q2 is interior and is determined by
G 1(1     q2)  c 
 + q2
g(G 1(1     q2))
= 0: (28)
By (4), p2 = G 1(1     q2).
Next, the Case 2 happens when
@(q1; q2)
@q1
jq1=;q2=0  0
@(q1; q2)
@q2
jq1=;q2=0  0,
which are satised when  Eo()  G 1(1   )   c   g(G 1(1 ))  0. By (4), p2 = G 1(1   ) and hence
the monopoly prot is (Eo() +G 1(1  )  c).
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Finally, Case 3 happens when
@(q1; q2)
@q1
jq1=;q2=0 < 0
@(q1; q2)
@q2
jq1=;q2=0  0,
which are satised when G 1(1  )  c  g(G 1(1 )) <  Eo().
In Case 3, q1 is the interior solution and is determined by
@(q1 ; 0)
@q1
= 0
Eo() +G
 1(1  q1)  c 
q1
g(G 1(1  q1))
= 0: (29)
The corresponding prot is therefore (Eo() +G 1(1  q1)  c)q1 . Q.E.D.
Proof for Corollary 3: We rst show that the optimal prot is continuous in . First, consider
H() = 0. By Lemma 3 the function H(:) is strictly decreasing. Given that H() = 0 and q2 is determined
by H( + q2) = 0, it must follow that q

2 = 0 at H() = 0. Hence, the monopolists optimal prot in Case
1 equals to that in Case 2 at H() = 0. Next, consider  Eo() = H(). Because q1 is determined by
 Eo() = H(q1), it must follow that q1 =  at  Eo() = H(). Hence, the monopolists prot in Case 2
equals that in Case 3 at  Eo() = H().
Next, we show that the optimal prot is increasing in . First, consider Case 1. Let 1 denote the
optimal prot in Case 1. Substitute q2 = 1    G(p2) into 1and take the derivative of 1 with respect to
, we have
d1
d
=
@1
@
+
@1
@p2
@p2
@
=
@1
@
= Eo() + (p2   c)(Fp(p2)  Fo(p2)) (30)
The second equality follows from the Envelope theorem. Since Fo() rst order stochastically dominates
Fp(), Fp(p2)  Fo(p2) and hence @
1
@
> 0.
Consider Case 2. Let 2 denote the optimal prot in Case 2. Take the derivative
d2
d
= Eo() + p2   c+ dp2
d
. (31)
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By the market clear condition G(p2)  1  , we derive
dp2
d
=
Fp(p2)  Fo(p2)  1
g(p2)
.
Substitute
dp2
d
into (31),
d2
d
= Eo() + p2   c+ (Fp(p2)  Fo(p2)  1)
g(p2)
.
Since in Case 2,  Eo()  H(),
d2
d
 Fp(p2)  Fo(p2)
g(p2)
  0.
Finally, consider Case 3. Let 3 denote the optimal prot in Case 3. Take the derivative and apply the
Envelope theorem, we have
d3
d
=
@3
@
(32)
= (Eo() + p2   c)(Fp(p2)  Fo(p2))  0:
Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 1. The proof has two steps. Step 1 shows that the monopolist will sell to both
types of consumers in period one when  < b. Step 2 shows that the monopolist will sell to optimistic
consumers in period one exclusively when   bb.
Step 1. By Lemma 4, when  < H 1(0), the monopolists maximum prot from selling to optimistic
consumers is characterized in Case 1. The monopolist sells  + q units in the two periods. We can rewrite
the monopolists maximal prot as
Eo() + (p2   c)( + q2). (33)
Now, suppose that the monopolist charges pessimistic consumersmaximum willingness to pay and sells
 + q2 units in period one and zero unit in period two. By the market clear condition (4), p2 is determined
by the total stock of the good in the two periods and hence remains unchanged in this alternative selling
strategy. The monopolists corresponding prot is
(Ep() + p2   c)( + q2) (34)
= (Ep())( + q

2) + (p2   c)( + q2):
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The prot (34) is greater than (33) if
q2 >
Eo()  Ep()
Ep()
, (35)
where q2 is determined by G
 1(1      q2)   c = +q

2
g(G 1(1  q2 )) (see Lemma 4). By the Implicit Function
Theorem, dq

2
d =  1 < 0. When  = 0, q2 is determined by F 1p (1   q2)   c = q

2
fp(G 1(1 q2 )) . Given that
F 1p (1 q2) = p2, q2 is the optimal static monopoly output when the monopolist faces pessimistic consumers
only. Since c < , q2 > 0. As a result, (35) is satised at  = 0. Now, consider  = H
 1(0) > 0. At this
value of , Case 2 happens, and q2 = 0 and hence (35) is violated. Since q

2 decreases in , there exists a
cuto¤ value b 2 (0; H 1(0)) such that (35) is satised for all  < b.
Step 2. Consider   H 1( Eo()). We rst show that it is more protable to sell to optimistic
consumers exclusively than to sell to all consumers in period one. Given   H 1( Eo()), the optimal
prot from selling to optimistic consumers exclusively is summarized in Case 3 of Lemma 4, which is greater
than
() = (Eo() +G
 1(1  )  c), (36)
the prot from selling to all of the optimistic consumers in period one and zero unit in period two. So, at
 = 1, the monopoly prot in Case 3 is at least Eo()   c, which is derived by evaluating (36) at  = 1.
Clearly, Eo()   c is greater than Ep()   c, the prot from charging pessimistic consumersmaximum
willingness to pay and selling to all consumers in period one.
Next, we show selling to optimistic consumers is more protable than selling to both types of consumers
and rationing. Let p2k q

1k, k = o; p, denote the optimal second period price and rst period quantity when
the monopolist charges type k consumersmaximum willingness to pay in period one. By Lemma 2, p2p is
determined by
Ep() + p

2p   c =
1 G(p2p )
g(p2p )
: (37)
Using G(p2o ) = 1  q1o, the market clear condition in Case 3 of Lemma 4, we can rewrite (29) as
Eo() + p

2o   c =
1 G(p2o )
g(p2o )
, (38)
which determines p2o . Assumption 1 implies that
1 G()
g() is decreasing in . Since Eo() > Ep(), (37) and
(38) implies p2o < p

2p . In both Lemma 2 and Case 3 of Lemma 4, the second period output is zero. By
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the market clear condition G(p2k ) = 1  q1k, p2o < p2p is equivalent to
G 1(1  q1o) < G 1(1  q1p)
q1p < q

1o.
Since q1o < , it follows that q

1p < . Now, given q

1p < , the monopoly can charge optimistic consumers
maximum willingness to pay and sell the same amount q1p in period one and zero unit in period two. Because
the total stock of the good doesnt change, the second period price remains unchanged. This alternative
selling strategy yields prot
(Eo() + p

2p   c)(1 G 1(p2p )) > (Ep() + p2p   c)(1 G 1(p2p )):
Therefore, when   H 1( Eo()), the optimal prot from charging pessimistic consumersmaximum
willingness to pay and rationing is lower than the prot in Case 3 of Lemma 4. Q.E.D.
Proof for Lemma 6: The proof is divided in two steps. Step 1 shows that if the monopolist chooses
q1 = 1, the maximum prot it can achieve is 2Ep[]  c. Step 2 shows that any interior rst period output
0 < q1 < 1 is dominated by q1 = 1.
Step 1. When the monopolist sells to pessimistic consumers, the maximum rst period price it can charge
is
p1 = 2Ep[]  (1  Fp(p2))(Ep[j  p2]  p2).
The monopolists prot from selling to all consumers in period one is therefore
2Ep[]  (1  Fp(p2))(Ep[j  p2]  p2)  c;
which is maximized at p2 = . So, the maximum prot the monopolist can make from selling to all consumers
in period one is
p(q1 = 1; p2 = ) = 2Ep[]  c.
Step 2. The monopolist solves the following problem
max
q1;p2
(p1   c)q1 + (p2   c)(1 G(p2))(1  q1)
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s.t.
p1 = 2Ep[]  (1  Fp(p2))(Ep[j  p2]  p2). (39)
Suppose the optimal rst period quantity is interior. That is, 0 < q1 < 1. Let p

2   denote the associated
optimal second period price. The monopolists prot is
p(q

1 ; p

2)
= (2Ep[]  (1  Fp(p2))(Ep[j  p2]  p2)  c)q1
+(p2   c)(1 G(p2))(1  q1):
If q1 is interior, it must satisfy the rst order condition:
2Ep[]  (1  Fp(p2))(Ep[j  p2]  p2)  c = (p2   c)(1 G(p2)): (40)
Now, we take the di¤erence between p(q1 = 1; p2 = ) and that from choosing q1 < 1 and p

2:
4 = p(q1 = 1; p2 = )  p(q1 ; p2)
= (2Ep[]  c)(1  q1) + (1  Fp(p2))(Ep[j  p2]  p2)q1  
(p2   c)(1 G(p2))(1  q1)]:
Using (40), we can simplify 4 to
(2Ep[]  c)  (p2   c)(1 G(p2)) > 0: (41)
The inequality follows from the assumption 2Ep[]   because
(p2   c)(1 G(p2)) <    c  2Ep[]  c.
In summary, (41) contradicts the initial hypothesis that it is optimal to sell in both periods. Q.E.D.
Proof for Lemma 7: When targeting optimistic consumers, the monopolist chooses q1 and p2 to
maximize
o(q1; p2) = (2Eo[]  (1  Fo(p2))(Eo[j  p2]  p2)  c)q1
+(p2   c) f(   q1)(1  Fo(p2) + (1  )(1  Fp(p2))g
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subject to 0  q1  . The rst order condition with respect to q1 is
2Eo[]  c  (1  Fo(p2))(Eo[j  p2]  c): (42)
The assumption 2Ep[]   implies 2Eo[] > . Since Eo[j  p2]  , (42) is greater than
   c  (1  Fo(p2))(   c)
= (   c)Fo(p2) > 0.
Hence, the optimal rst period quantity must be the corner solution q1 = . p

2 is pinned down by
@o(q1;p2)
@p2

0: Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 3: The monopolists maximum prot from targeting the optimistic consumers
is
o(; p

2) = (2Eo[]  (1  Fo(p2))(Eo[j  p2]  p2)  c)
+(p2   c)(1  )(1  Fp(p2)).
By the Envelope theorem,
@o(; p

2)
@
= (2Eo[]  (1  Fo(p2))(Eo[j  p2]  p2)  c) 
(p2   c)(1  Fp(p2)):
BecauseFp(p2)  Fo(p2), it follows that
@o(; p

2)
@
 (2Eo[]  (1  Fo(p2))(Eo[j  p2]  p2)  c) 
(p2   c)(1  Fp(p2))
= 2Eo[]  c  (1  Fo(p2))(Eo[j  p2]  c)
> (   c)Fo(p2) > 0.
The second to the last inequality follows from 2Eo[] >  and Eo[j  p2]  .
Now, we compare the monopolists optimal prot from targeting the pessimistic consumers 2Ep[]   c
with o(; p2). When  = 0,
o(; p

2) = (p

2   c)(1  Fp(p2)).
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Because 2Ep[] > , 2Ep[]  c > o(; p2): When  = 1,
o(; p

2) = 2Eo[]  c.
This is because when  = 1, p2 = . So, 2Ep[]   c < o(; p2) at  = 1 Since o(; p2) is continuous and
increasing in , there exists e 2 (0; 1) such that
2Ep[]  c > o(; p2) for  > e
2Ep[]  c = o(; p2) for  = e
2Ep[]  c < o(; p2) for  < e .
Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 4: The di¤erence (12) is negative if and only if
q1 [E(j  p2)  E()]  (1  q1) [2E()  c] < 0
c < 2E()  q

1 [E(j  p2)  E()]
(1  q1)
. (43)
Substituting q1 = 1 G(p2), the right hand side of (43) becomes
2E()  (1 G(p

2)) (E(j  p2)  E())
G(p2)
= E() +
E()  (1 G(p2))E(j  p2)
G(p2)
= E() + E(j < p2).
Q.E.D.
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